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THE PROBLEMS OF
POURING-RIGHTS CONTRACTS
DAVID S. ALMELING
INTRODUCTION
Commercial activities abound in public schools. These activities
range from direct advertisements to product sales, from instructional
materials to market research.1 This Note examines one type of
commercial activity: soft-drink sales through pouring-rights contracts
in public schools. Pouring-rights contracts refer to “large payments
from soft-drink companies to [schools or] school districts in return for
the right to sell that company’s products—and only those products.”2
The legal response to these contracts is a tattered patchwork of local,
state, and federal regulations.3
This Note argues that pouring-rights contracts cause several
problems, and that these problems demand a legal solution.
Principally, they harm students by encouraging the frequent
consumption of soft drinks, which increases obesity. These contracts
also undermine the integrity of public education by using compulsory
education laws to expose children to unhealthy soft drinks, they dilute
the curriculum by discouraging soft-drink consumption in nutrition
classes while encouraging soft-drink consumption the rest of the day,
Copyright © 2003 by David S. Almeling.
1. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,
PUBLIC EDUCATION: COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES IN SCHOOLS 3 (2000) (using this taxonomy to
identify and describe the laws and policies that governed commercial activities in public schools
between November 1999 and August 2000).
2. MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES
NUTRITION AND HEALTH 197 (2002).
3. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 10–13 (outlining various local,
state, and federal regulations that govern the sale of soft drinks in public schools).
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and they disproportionately affect poor communities that need
funding from these contracts to provide basic educational services.
To solve these problems, and to mend the patchwork of
regulation, this Note suggests a three-part solution: (1) federal action
to remove the local incentive to sign pouring-rights contracts and to
establish uniform standards; (2) fundamental changes in the current
laws to restrict the sale of soft drinks in schools beyond current
prohibitions; and (3) comprehensive action to address the underlying
problem of the sale of soft drinks. Combining these elements, Part III
suggests federal legislation that requires the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) to eliminate current regulations and replace
them with regulations that ban the sale of soft drinks and pouring-
rights contracts in public schools. Before Part III advances this
solution, Part I of this Note describes the milieu and details the
problems of pouring-rights contracts, and Part II outlines the legal
authority over these contracts.
I.  MILIEU AND PROBLEMS
A. Milieu of Pouring-Rights Contracts
Commercial activities in public schools are not new. Schools used
corporate-sponsored materials as early as 1890 when “a paint
company developed a handout on primary and secondary colors for
schools to distribute in their art classes.”4 In another example, the
Coca-Cola Company sent booklets of its history and products to
elementary schools in the 1970s, despite its then-stated policy that it
would not advertise directly to children under twelve.5 At present,
commercial activities are ubiquitous.6 Thus, while commercial
activities in public schools are not new, “[w]hat is new today is the
popularity of these practices and the wide range of
businesses involved.”7
4. Id. at 5–6.
5. SHEILA HARTY, HUCKSTERS IN THE CLASSROOM: A REVIEW OF INDUSTRY
PROPAGANDA IN SCHOOLS 38 (1979).
6. See Jason Vaughn, Big Business and the Blackboard: A Winning Combination for the
Classroom?, J.L. & EDUC., Apr. 1997, at 35, 37 (“Nearly every school sports field is adorned
with the advertisements of team sponsors, most school newspapers and yearbooks actively
solicit for advertisements from the local community, and advertisements for high school rings
and school apparel have been tolerated for years.”).
7. Jeff I. Richards et al., The Growing Commercialization of Schools: Issues and Practices,
557 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 148, 149 (1998).
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Three factors explain the recent popularity and increasing
breadth of commercial activities in public schools. First, schools face
severe budget shortfalls.8 These shortfalls force schools to accept
commercial activities to meet essential educational needs.9 Second,
children influence a large amount of money; for example, in 1999,
children aged six through nineteen influenced $485 billion in
spending.10 These numbers are too big for companies to resist. Third,
schools provide a unique commercial opportunity. Companies view
schools, which confine children and restrict advertising, as one of few
places where their activities can transcend the din of commercial
advertising.11 Moreover, companies can target children in schools
more effectively than with more diffuse methods, such as television.12
Thus, declining school budgets and significant youth spending
combine with corporate strategy to explain the increase in
commercial activities in public schools.
The best-known example of a commercial activity in public
schools is Channel One.13 Channel One “provides schools with more
than $50,000 worth of televisions, video cassette recorders, and
satellite dishes under the stipulation that the contracting school
broadcast the twelve minute Channel One news program to its
8. See, e.g., David Pierson, Pressure Builds for Burbank School Board, L.A. TIMES, May
1, 2002, at B4.
9. See Anand Vaishnav, Budget Cuts May Affect Classrooms, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3,
2002, at B9 (“[W]ith shrinking state revenues, schools now have to make due [sic] with less—
and make tough choices as proposed budget cuts loom.”).
10. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 176; see also Joe L. Kincheloe, McDonald’s, Power, and
Children: Ronald McDonald (aka Ray Kroc) Does It All for You, in KINDERCULTURE: THE
CORPORATE CONSTRUCTION OF CHILDHOOD 249, 255 (Shirley R. Steinberg & Joe L.
Kincheloe eds., 1997) (noting that children influence $82 billion in food and drink purchases per
year).
11. See Alex Molnar, Colonizing Our Future: The Commercial Transformation of
America’s Schools, Education Policy Studies Laboratory, at http://www.asu.edu/educ/epsl/
CERU/Documents/cace-00-01.htm (Mar. 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“Apart
from places of worship, schools are perhaps the most uncluttered ad environment in our
society.”).
12. Id.
13. Channel One is important to a discussion of pouring-rights contracts because judicial
opinions on the legality of Channel One articulate the courts’ acceptance of commercial
activities in public schools. For a discussion of these opinions, see infra notes 116–126 and
accompanying text.
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students ninety-five percent of school days.”14 Two of the twelve
minutes must consist of advertisements.15
The topic of this Note—soft-drink sales through pouring-rights
contracts—is another example of a commercial activity. The sale of
soft drinks in public schools has been around for decades.16 Pouring-
rights contracts have also been around for decades, often used to
finance sports stadiums.17 However, pouring-rights contracts in public
schools are a relatively recent innovation. They began in the early
1990s when soft-drink companies signed exclusive deals with
universities.18 After universities, soft-drink companies targeted
elementary, middle, and high schools.19 Consequently, in less than ten
years, soft drink “contracts granting exclusive sales and advertising
rights appear to be replacing informal arrangements between vendors
and school officials” as the means by which public schools sell soft
drinks.20 In other words, soft-drink sales through pouring-rights
contracts are relatively recent, but their prevalence and impact is
growing rapidly.
Those factors that explain the growth in commercial activities
also explain the growth of pouring-rights contracts—namely,
shrinking school budgets, rising youth spending, and a corporate
strategy that targets children at school. Two additional factors help
explain the growth of pouring-rights contracts in schools. First, soft
drinks, with a low-unit cost and a need for constant replacement,
14. Christina Lee Dasinger, Students for Sale: The Regulation of Televised Commercial
Advertising in Public Schools, 20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 197, 197 (1996).
15. Cynthia Newsome, Note, Pay Attention: A Survey and Analysis of the Legal Battle over
the Integration of Forced Television Advertising into the Public School Curriculum, 24 RUTGERS
L.J. 281, 292 (1992).
16. See NESTLE, supra note 2, at 207 (“By the late 1960s, coin-operated vending machines
selling soft drinks and snacks were already well established in schools.”).
17. See Ralph C. Anzivino, Reorganization of the Professional Sports Franchise, 12 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 9, 58 (2001) (“Pouring rights are negotiated locally and each team receives the
revenue from such a contract right.”); Matthew J. Parlow, Publicly Financed Sports Facilities:
Are They Economically Justifiable? A Case Study of the Los Angeles Staples Center, 10 U.
MIAMI. BUS. L. REV. 483, 504 (2002) (“Teams or local governments derive revenue from
concessions in one of three ways: charging royalties based on sales, charging a fixed fee not
based on sales, or a combination of the two.”).
18. See, e.g., Rutgers Sells Vending Rights to Coca-Cola, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1994, at B9.
19. See NESTLE, supra note 2, at 202 (“Pouring-rights contracts emerged as a particularly
effective marketing strategy.”).
20. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 18.
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require a marketing strategy called intensive distribution.21 Intensive
distribution attempts to saturate the market, “enabling the consumer
to purchase soft-drink beverages with a minimum of effort.”22 Thus,
intensive distribution of soft drinks aimed at children must include
schools, where children spend a substantial amount of their time.
Second, soft-drink companies thrive on consumer brand loyalty.23
Thus, soft-drink companies that attempt to build brand loyalty as
young as possible must target schools.
Pouring-rights contracts represent the fastest growing area of
product sales in schools.24 According to the most recent study,25 nearly
one-third of public school districts have a pouring-rights contract with
a soft-drink company.26 These contracts vary widely, ranging from a
single school with a one-year contract to a consortium of districts with
a ten-year contract.27
B. Educational Problems
Pouring-rights contracts endanger education in three ways. First,
they undermine the integrity of compulsory education laws.28 The
purpose of these laws is “to produce citizens who can think critically
21. RONALD D. MICHMAN & EDWARD M. MAZZE, THE FOOD INDUSTRY WARS:
MARKETING TRIUMPHS AND BLUNDERS 236 (1998).
22. Id.
23. Julie Johnson Bradford, Pop or Hops?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 6,
2002, at WUP18 (“The soft drink industry knows if they capture consumers when they are kids,
they stand a good chance of keeping them when they are older.”).
24. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 16.
25. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE SCHOOL MEALS INITIATIVE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY:
THIRD YEAR REPORT xiii–xiv (2002) (sampling 2,325 school districts, which created a
“nationally representative sample of public school food authorities (SFAs) participating in the
[National School Lunch Program]”).
26. Id. at xxii; see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CHILDREN’S DIETS IN THE MID-1990S:
DIETARY INTAKE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH SCHOOL MEAL PARTICIPATION 159 (2001)
(“Most schools offer children the option of purchasing a la carte items outside the regular
school meal.”).
27. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 16. Although these contracts are
widespread, the sale of soft drinks in public schools accounts for just over one percent of Coca-
Cola’s North American business. Betsy McKay, Coke Finds Its Exclusive School Contracts
Aren’t So Easily Given Up, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2001, at B1.
28. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802 (West 2002) (requiring “[e]very child
between the ages of six and sixteen years” to attend school); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (West
1999) (stating that “[e]very parent, guardian or other person having custody and control of a
child between the ages of six and 16 years shall cause such child regularly to attend” public or
private schools).
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and participate in democracy.”29 Pouring-rights contracts thwart this
purpose by using compulsory education law to force children to be
exposed to soft drinks.30 In other words, soft-drink companies take
advantage of compulsory education laws that were meant to produce
critical citizens by transforming public schools from institutions of
learning into commercial environments. Some commentators couch
this criticism as violating the schools’ in loco parentis responsibility31
or violating the students’ liberty interest.32 Indeed, these are some of
the theories advanced by critics of pouring-rights contracts as
potential grounds for litigation.33
Second, pouring-rights contracts dilute the effect of a school’s
curriculum. Specifically, the sale of soft drinks in schools contravenes
the lessons of nutrition classes by promoting a healthy diet in class
and then permitting children to consume unhealthy soft drinks when
they are not in class.34 This contravention is particularly dangerous
because students perceive soft drinks sold in school as endorsed by
the school.35 In other words, pouring-rights contracts create a conflict
between theory and practice. In theory, children are told to limit their
consumption of soft drinks. But in practice, schools encourage
29. MICHAEL F. JACOBSON & LAURIE ANN MAZUR, MARKETING MADNESS: A
SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR A CONSUMER SOCIETY 37 (1995); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 213 (1972) (“There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for
education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education.” (emphasis added)).
30. Cf. JACOBSON & MAZUR, supra note 29, at 36 (“[C]ompulsory attendance confers on
educators an obligation to protect the welfare of their students and the integrity of the learning
environment.”); see also DERON BOYLES, AMERICAN EDUCATION AND CORPORATIONS: THE
FREE MARKET GOES TO SCHOOL xiv–xv (1998) (arguing that commercial influences in schools
“limit and reduce the capacities of students and teachers to be critical citizens”).
31. See Newsome, supra note 15, at 289 (“Some opponents argue that this compromise
[with commercial influences] represents a breach of the schools’ special duty to protect children
from danger while they are forced to be away from home.”).
32. See id. (arguing that forcing children to become targets of commercial activities “is an
unjustified intrusion into student liberty interests”).
33. See infra notes 127–128 and accompanying text.
34. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOODS SOLD IN COMPETITION WITH USDA SCHOOL MEAL
PROGRAMS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, at http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/Lunch/
CompetitiveFoods/report_congress.htm (Jan. 12, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
35. Linda Mae Carlstone, A Lesson in Simple Arithmetic, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 2, 1995,
at 22 (reporting that marketers deliberately try to advertise in schools because there is an
“implied endorsement from a trusted institution”); Richard Salit & Celeste Tarricone, Soda
Wars: Coke, Pepsi Pay Big for Sole Rights to Sell Soft Drinks in Schools, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL.,
Mar. 14, 1999, at 1A (“School buildings lend credibility to soda machines and their products,
and that’s why soft drink companies are so eager to get their products inside them . . . .”).
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students to drink soft drinks because schools need the money that
they derive from pouring-rights contracts.
Third, pouring-rights contracts can disproportionately affect
poor communities. It is unclear whether companies target schools in
poorer communities. 36 Nonetheless, districts most in need of funding
are the first to succumb to the bargaining power of soft drink
companies. 37
C. Health Problems
Soft drinks are made from carbonated water, sugar, and flavors.38
An average twelve-ounce soft drink “contains 40 grams of added
sugar—and provides about 160 calories—but little else of nutritional
value.”39 Soft-drink consumption contributes to many health
problems, including obesity, osteoporosis, tooth decay, heart disease,
kidney stones, and addiction.40 This Note focuses on the contribution
of soft drinks to obesity-related health problems.
36. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 25, at xxii (“The share of districts under
contract was . . . more prevalent among low-poverty districts than among high-poverty districts
(35.0% versus 20.5%).”), with Newsome, supra note 15, at 312 (“The pattern of approval for
Channel One demonstrates that local school boards, especially in poorer districts, are
vulnerable to the lure of Channel One’s free equipment.”), and Michael Morgan, Channel One
in the Public Schools: Widening the Gaps, at http://www.umass.edu/communication/
resources/special_reports/channel_one/ch_one_report.shtml (Oct. 2003):
[S]chools with the greatest concentration of low-income students are more than twice
as likely (37.7% vs. 16.6%) as the schools with the wealthiest students to have
Channel One. The data show a very strong and monotonic pattern: as community
income levels drop, the proportion of schools receiving Channel One steadily rises . . .
.
37. See Lisa Greene, Bush Takes Aim at “Obesity Epidemic”, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Oct. 16, 2003, at 1B (“Faced with state budget cuts, some school districts have embarked on
exclusive contracts with soft drink companies that pay millions in exchange for putting drinks
machines in schools.”); Susan H. Thompson, Bubble Trouble, TAMPA TRIB., March 16, 2004, at
1 (“Amid sharp budget cuts for education, [some] school districts are relying on the quarters,
nickels and dimes from students who buy soft drinks at school.”); Joel Turner, PTA Leaders
Urge Schools to Curb Candy Sales, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, April 15, 2003, at B3
(“Superintendent Wayne Harris said schools need the money from soft-drink sales to help pay
for educational programs because of the state’s budget crisis and the school district’s financial
crunch.”).
38. Marion Nestle, Soft Drink “Pouring Rights”: Marketing Empty Calories, PUB. HEALTH
REP., July–Aug. 2000, at 308, 309 (noting that “diet sodas substitute artificial sweeteners for the
sugar but are not currently consumed by children to any great extent”).
39. Id.
40. See generally Michael F. Jacobson, Liquid Candy: How Soft Drinks are Harming
Americans’ Health, at http://www.cspinet.org/sodapop/liquid_candy.htm (last visited Dec. 30,
2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (surveying the correlation between the consumption
of soft drinks and various health problems). Several commentators have examined various
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To appreciate the severity of obesity-related health problems,
one must first understand the obesity crisis among America’s youth.41
The Surgeon General issued a “Call to Action” in 1999 when he
reported that “61 percent of U.S. adults were overweight or obese,
and 13 percent of children and adolescents were overweight.”42 These
numbers were not always this large: “Today there are nearly twice as
many overweight children and almost three times as many overweight
adolescents as there were in 1980.”43
Researchers estimate that 300,000 deaths per year in the United
States are associated with obesity.44 The relationship between obesity
and death is multifarious: obesity “substantially raises [a person’s]
risk of morbidity from hypertension, dyslipidemia, type 2 diabetes,
coronary heart disease, stroke, gallbladder disease, osteoarthritis,
sleep apnea and respiratory problems, and endometrial, breast,
prostate, and colon cancers.”45 There are also significant economic
costs associated with obesity. The total cost attributable to obesity in
1995 was $99.2 billion;46 in 2000, total costs rose to $117 billion.47
Soft-drink consumption contributes substantially to obesity-
related health problems,48 in large part because soft drinks are the
health problems associated with the consumption of soft drinks. See, e.g., Curtis R. Ellison et al.,
Current Caffeine Intake of Young Children: Amount and Sources, 95 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 802
(1995) (dangers of increased caffeine consumption); Amid I. Ismail et al., The Cariogenicity of
Soft Drinks in the United States, 109 J. AM. DENTAL ASS’N 241 (1984) (tooth decay); Grace
Wyshak & Rose E. Frisch, Carbonated Beverages, Dietary Calcium, the Dietary
Calcium/Phosphorus Ratio, and Bone Fractures in Girls and Boys, 15 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH
210 (1994) (bone fractures).
41. The Surgeon General and most researchers use the Body Mass Index (BMI) to define
overweight and obesity. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S
CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 4 (2001). BMI is a
measure of weight in relation to height. Id. An adult with a BMI of 30 kg/m2 or greater is
considered obese while an adult with a BMI between 25 kg/m2 and 29.9 kg/m2 is considered
overweight. Id. This Note uses the term “obese” to refer to both groups.
42. Id. at xiii.
43. Id.
44. David B. Allison et al., Annual Deaths Attributable to Obesity in the United States, 282
JAMA 1530, 1530 (1999).
45. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION,
EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS: THE EVIDENCE
REPORT xi (1998); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 41, at 9 (citing
a laundry list of health problems associated with obesity).
46. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 45, at 9.
47. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 41, at 10.
48. See generally Jacobson, supra note 40 (discussing the health consequences of
consuming large quantities of carbonated soft drinks).
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number one source of added sugars in children’s diets.49 Most
adolescents (65 percent of girls and 74 percent of boys) consume soft
drinks daily.50 As a result, the average thirteen- to eighteen-year-old
receives about 9 percent of his or her daily calories from soft drinks.51
Moreover, “overweight youths tended to consume a greater
proportion of [calories] from beverages than did their nonoverweight
counterparts.”52 This means that while soft drinks contribute to
obesity in children generally, they specifically harm those already
susceptible to obesity. One study, which found that the
“[c]onsumption of sugar-sweetened drinks is associated with obesity
in children,”53 concluded that the “ratio of becoming obese among
children increased 1.6 times for each additional can or glass of sugar-
sweetened drink that they consumed every day.”54 In sum, while there
are many factors that contribute to obesity—lack of exercise, high
caloric intake, genetics, etc.—soft drinks are a significant factor.
In addition to the simple fact that pouring-rights contracts make
soft drinks available in schools, these contracts increase the unhealthy
consumption of soft drinks in two additional ways. First, they compel
schools to push soft drinks on children because these contracts often
have quotas that require schools to sell a certain amount of soft
drinks to get the promised financial rewards.55 For example, one
Maryland school entered into a contract that contained the following
clause: “[I]f the Board of Education actively enforces the policy in
which vending machines are turned off during the school day, the
49. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 32 (2000).
50. David S. Ludwig et al., Relation Between Consumption of Sugar-Sweetened Drinks and
Childhood Obesity: A Prospective, Observational Analysis, 357 LANCET 505, 505 (2001).
51. Jacobson, supra note 40.
52. Richard P. Troiano et al., Energy and Fat Intakes of Children and Adolescents in the
United States: Data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys, 72 AM. J.
CLINICAL NUTRITION 1343S, 1351S (Supp. 2000).
53. Ludwig et al., supra note 50, at 505.
54. Id. at 507.
55. Jill L. Kramer-Atwood et al., Fostering Healthy Food Consumption in Schools:
Focusing on the Challenges of Competitive Foods, 102 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 1228, 1229 (2002)
(“Because consumption quotas often need to be met to receive some of the awards offered by
bottlers or vendors to schools, students may be urged by school personnel to buy those
products.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 25, at VII-9 (“Of those districts that
were under contract to a soft drink company in [school year] 1999/00, over one-third reported
that their contract applied to products sold in the cafeteria.”); NESTLE, supra note 2, at 205
(“But because the contracts provide additional benefits for consumption levels that surpass
quotas, school administrators are placed in the position of pushing soft drinks to faculty, staff,
and students.”).
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commission guarantee will be suspended.”56 This problem is intrinsic
to these contracts because if schools sell fewer soft drinks, then soft-
drink companies will sign fewer contracts because their sales are
diminishing.
Second, these contracts decrease a child’s consumption of more
nutritious food. One study found that “soft drinks displace milk and
fruit juice in the diets of children and adolescents.”57 In another study,
students who consumed soft drinks reported low fruit and high caloric
intakes.58 In addition to competing with nutritious food in general,
soft drinks also compete with nutritious, federally subsidized meals.59
For example, from “1985 to 1997, school districts decreased the
amounts of milk they bought by nearly 30% and increased their
purchases of carbonated sodas by an impressive 1,100%.”60 In sum,
pouring-rights contracts increase the consumption of soft drinks,
which increase obesity-related health problems. Unfortunately, as
Part II discusses, current legal authority fails to solve these problems.
II.  LEGAL AUTHORITY
A. Introduction to Nutrition Control in Public Schools
Public education is principally a state responsibility,61 and each
state establishes its own system of public education.62 To administer
this system, most state legislatures vest “general leadership,
supervisory, and regulatory functions to a state board and department
56. David Nakamura, Schools Hooked on Junk Food: Reliance on Vending Proceeds
Decried—and Defended, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2001, at A1.
57. Lisa Harnack et al., Soft Drink Consumption Among U.S. Children and Adolescents:
Nutritional Consequences, 99 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 436, 439 (1999).
58. Karen Weber Cullen et al., Intake of Soft Drinks, Fruit-Flavored Beverages, and Fruits
and Vegetables by Children in Grades 4 Through 6, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1475, 1476–77
(2002).
59. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 25, at VI-13 (“Where a la carte food sales are
offered, they compete directly with reimbursable meals and, therefore, with the accomplishment
of SMI’s [School Meals Initiative] nutritional objectives.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
supra note 34 (“It is important to note that States with restrictive competitive food policies—
like Louisiana, West Virginia, Georgia, and Mississippi—maintain rates of participation in
school meal programs that are higher than the national average.”).
60. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 198–99.
61. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education in
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.”).
62. See generally EDWARD. C. BOLMEIER, THE SCHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRUCTURE 88–99
(2d ed. 1973) (discussing and providing the states’ constitutional provisions for establishing
public schools).
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of education.”63 The state board and the department of education
then delegate most of the administration of education programs to
local school districts, which are governed by local boards of
education.64 These local “boards have broad discretion in the
management of school affairs.”65
Local authorities also dominate decisions about commercial
activities.66 Because different local officials have different preferences,
local control results in different levels of commercial activities across
districts.67 To illustrate, nineteen states had laws governing
commercial activities in schools in 2000, but in fourteen states those
statutes and regulations were not comprehensive and addressed only
certain types of activities.68
While states are principally responsible for education, the federal
government is involved in many aspects of education,69 particularly
nutrition control. The principal means of federal nutrition control are
the National School Lunch Act70 and the School Breakfast Program
under the Child Nutrition Act71 (collectively the school meals
programs or programs). The USDA administers these school meals
63. Charles F. Faber, Is Local Control of the Schools Still a Viable Option?, 14 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 447, 447 (1991); see also WILLIAM D. VALENTE, LAW IN THE SCHOOLS 10 (4th
ed. 1998) (“Most states employ a three-tier system of state-level, regional (intermediate), and
local administration. A minority of states employ a two-echelon (state-local) administrative
structure, whereas Hawaii has a single statewide administration.”).
64. Faber, supra note 63, at 447.
65. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863 (1982); see also Lisa M. Spenny, Comment,
Commercialism in New York Public Schools: State Versus Local Control, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 339, 343 (1996) (arguing that “local school boards, because of their unique proximity to
and relation with the community, possess the necessary authority to make” decisions that affect
local communities).
66. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 14.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 3–4.
69. See H.C. HUDGINS, JR. & RICHARD S. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCATION:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND COURT DECISIONS 6 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that federal laws
regulate “programs in such areas as adult education, vocational and technical education,
multicultural education, special education, science education, foreign language education, and
others”); see also Faber, supra note 63, at 453:
[T]he federal government has always had some involvement in and influence upon
the educational affairs of the nation. The federal government’s early participation in
education ranged from land grants and distribution of surplus funds for the
establishment of common schools to special purpose grants for the establishment of
land grant colleges in the 1800s.
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751–1769 (2000).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1771–1791 (2000).
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programs,72 but participation is voluntary.73 In one recent year, 4.2
billion lunches and 1 billion breakfasts were served through the
programs.74 The programs feed a daily average of 27 million children
at lunch and 7.3 million at breakfast.75 In addition to the federal
school meals program, the federal government is also involved with
the summer food service programs,76 the child and adult care food
program,77 the special milk program,78 and the special supplemental
nutrition program for women, infants, and children.79 The USDA
requires its meals under the school meals programs to “meet
minimum nutritional requirements prescribed by the Secretary.”80
Despite this federal role in nutrition control, states and local
districts maintain substantial control over nutrition decisions. To
begin, schools are not required to meet federal nutrition guidelines if
they choose not to participate in the federal meals programs.81 Even if
schools do participate in the programs, the USDA must operate
through state agencies, and these agencies have substantial discretion
to act without express federal authorization.82 Finally, although
federal regulations set the floor for nutrition standards, states are free
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1752 (2000) (enabling the Secretary of the USDA to carry out the
provisions of the federal meals programs); see also BONNIE B. TAYLOR, EDUCATION AND THE
LAW: A DICTIONARY 218 (1996) (noting that the “[s]chool meals programs are administered by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) through its Food and Consumer Service”).
73. Richmond Welfare Rights Org. v. Snodgrass, 525 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1975); Torres
v. Butz, 397 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
74. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 25, at III-7, III-10.
75. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 26, at xv.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1761 (2000).
77. Id. § 1766.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1772 (2000).
79. Id. § 1786.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1758(a)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1773(e)(1)(A) (“Breakfasts served by
schools participating in the school breakfast program under this section shall consist of a
combination of foods and shall meet the minimum nutritional requirements prescribed by the
Secretary on the basis of tested nutritional research.”).
81. See Shaw v. Governing Bd., 310 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (E.D. Cal. 1970) (“Since the
federal school lunch program is purely voluntary, a school district which feels it cannot afford to
meet the requirement of providing free lunches is free to drop out. So long as it chooses to
participate, however, the district must comply fully with the terms of the Act.”).
82. See Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1072 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that states have
substantial discretion over decisions regarding federal meal programs because “Congress would
not have assigned them to the states if it distrusted the states, wanted to insulate local school
boards from the states’ mandates, or thought that local boards’ decisions were singularly likely
to further the policies of the program”).
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to regulate further.83 In sum, while the federal government has an
active role in nutrition control, the states maintain
substantial responsibility.
B. Federal Control over the Sale of Soft Drinks in Public Schools
Current federal control over the sale of soft drinks in public
schools is the result “of nearly annual tinkering with the rules that
govern the school lunch and school breakfast programs.”84 The first
effort to restrict the sales of soft drinks was a 1970 amendment to the
Child Nutrition Act.85 During the 1970s, Congress vacillated between
giving the Secretary of the USDA the authority to restrict soft drinks
sales, and then removing that authority.86 One such attempt to give
the Secretary the authority to restrict the sale of soft drinks and other
competitive, unapproved foods was voided by National Soft Drink
Ass’n v. Block,87 which is discussed in detail in Part II.D.88
After Block, there was not much congressional effort to restrict
the sale of soft drinks in public schools until Congress amended the
School Lunch Act in 1994.89 But these amendments did not empower
the Secretary; rather, they left the decision about whether to restrict
the sale of soft drinks to state and local authorities.90 After these
amendments, soft-drink sales and pouring-rights contracts have
proliferated.91 Thus, the federal government has tried to address the
83. See Competitive Food Services, 7 C.F.R. § 210.11(b) (2003) (“State agencies and school
food authorities may impose additional restrictions on the sale of and income from all foods
sold at any time throughout schools participating in the Program.”).
84. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 207.
85. Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248, sec. 8, § 10, 84 Stat. 207, 212–13 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1779 (2000)).
86. See Nat’l Soft Drink Ass’n v. Block, 721 F.2d 1348, 1350–51 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (describing
the different congressional legislation and administrative regulations that were enacted during
the 1970s).
87. Id.
88. See infra notes 109–115 and accompanying text.
89. These amendments appeared in sections 101–125 of the Healthy Meals for Healthy
Americans Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-448, 108 Stat. 4699, 4700–34, (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751–1769 (2000)).
90. See NESTLE, supra note 2, at 211 (noting that although “a Senate committee suggested
that the USDA should . . . develop ‘model language’ to restrict sales of soft drinks and other
such foods in elementary schools before the end of the last lunch period,” the 1994 legislation
“left the decision about whether to adopt that language to the discretion of state and local
school authorities”).
91. Salit & Tarricone, supra note 35.
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sale of soft drinks in schools, but it no longer adheres to its previously
strong position of allowing the Secretary to restrict sales.
At present, current regulations only require state agencies and
schools to “prohibit the sale of foods of minimal nutritional value”92—
which includes soft drinks93—during federal school meal periods.94
These regulations define foods of minimal nutritional value as “food
which provides less than five percent of the Reference Daily Intakes
(RDI) for each of eight specified nutrients per serving.”95 These
regulations do not address the sale of soft drinks outside of the
cafeteria or during non-meal periods.96 Thus, current regulations only
restrict the sale of soft drinks in the cafeteria during the lunch period.
Despite recent attempts to expand the scope of federal regulations,97
current law permits the sale of soft drinks, and thus permits pouring-
rights contracts. As a result, the current onus of regulation falls on
states and localities to restrict the sale of soft drinks in public schools.
C. State and Local Control over the Sale of Soft Drinks
in Public Schools
State and local control over the sale of soft drinks in public
schools create a patchwork of regulations in which there is
considerable variation both between states and between localities in
the same state. For example, West Virginia and North Carolina have
statutes that specifically permit the sale of soft drinks.98 California, on
92. 7 C.F.R. § 210.11(b).
93. Id. § 210 app. B (naming “soda water,” defined as a “class of beverages made by
absorbing carbon dioxide in potable water,” as one of the prohibited categories). The
regulations also include hard candies, water ices, and chewing gum. Id.
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
95. 7 C.F.R. § 210.11(a)(2). The eight nutrients are protein, vitamin A, vitamin C, niacin,
riboflavin, thiamine, calcium, and iron.
96. See Nestle, supra note 38, at 308 (“Although the US Department of Agriculture
(USDA) requires federally subsidized school meal programs to meet established nutritional
standards and dietary guidelines . . . [such standards do] not apply to foods sold outside of
school cafeterias in snack bars, school stores, or vending machines.”).
97. See, e.g., Neil Buckley & Victoria Griffith, The Scary Fat End of the Wedge, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 12, 2002, at 11 (“Senators Bill Frist and Jeff Bingaman plan to introduce [an]
‘obesity bill’ [that will authorize] . . . federal agencies to spend more money educating the public
on the dangers of excess weight.”).
98. See W. VA. CODE § 18-2-6a (2003) (“In order to generate funding for necessary
programs and supplies, county boards may permit the sale of soft drinks in county high schools
except during breakfast and lunch periods.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-264 (2002) (“Each school
may, with the approval of the local board of education, sell soft drinks to students so long as soft
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the other hand, requires that a certain percentage of food sold
throughout the day come from a “nutritional list” that excludes
soft drinks.99
At the local level, some cities have rejected pouring-rights
contracts. For example, the Los Angeles Unified School District
prohibited the sale of soft drinks in its schools.100 Similarly, the
Oakland Unified School District adopted the following policy:
“[V]ending machines accessible to students shall not disperse sodas,
drinks that contain caffeine or a high concentration of sugar . . .
during school hours.”101 Conversely, school districts in San Diego,102
Evansville,103 and suburban Chicago104 all recently approved pouring-
rights contracts. In sum, there is piecemeal resistance, but most
jurisdictions eagerly sign these contracts.
Responding to concerns from parents and schools in 2001,105 the
Coca-Cola Company announced that it “supports adoption of non-
exclusive agreements with schools [and] will continue to return
revenue from beverage sales to support educational programs,
drinks are not sold (i) during the lunch period, (ii) at elementary schools, or (iii) contrary to the
requirements of the National School Lunch Program.”).
99. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 38,085 (West 2002).
100. Kim Severson, L.A. Schools to Stop Soda Sales, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 28, 2002, at A1
(“Los Angeles school district officials expelled soda pop from campus Tuesday night in a
unanimous vote that . . . means that no carbonated drinks can be sold during school hours
beginning in January 2004.”).
101. CTR. FOR FOOD & JUSTICE, OCCIDENTAL COLL., CHALLENGING THE SODA
COMPANIES: THE LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT SODA BAN, at
http://departments.oxy.edu/uepi/cfj/resources/SodaBan.htm (Sept. 2002) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
102. See Logan Jenkins, San Dieguito’s Sweet Pact with Pepsi Shows Lack of Regard for
Student Bodies, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 29, 2002, at NC-2 (reporting that the school
board stood to make more than $800,000 over five years as a result of its agreement with the
Pepsi Bottling Group).
103. See Patricia Swanson, School Board Reluctantly OKs Contract with Coke, EVANSVILLE
COURIER & PRESS, Aug. 12, 2003, at A7 (“The Evansville-Vanderburgh School Board,
unanimously but also reluctantly, has approved an exclusive soft drink contract with the Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. The $700,000 annual contract will help fund extracurricular activities in the
schools.”).
104. See Laura Zahn Pohl, Middle Schools Get Beverage Deal, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2002, at
DN-3 (reporting that the deal between the district’s middle schools and the Coca-Cola Bottling
Company could “return up to $275,000 to the schools’ coffers during the five-year deal”).
105. See Marc Kaufman, Coca-Cola Tries to Cap Exclusive School Deals, WASH. POST, Mar.
14, 2001, at A2 (stating that the Coca-Cola Company was “responding both to health concerns
about soda consumption and to criticism over the commercialization of schools”).
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without requiring exclusivity.”106 Despite this pledge, Coke’s bottlers
continue to sign pouring-rights contracts with schools.107 PepsiCo Inc.
has never made a similar statement and permits its bottlers to bid for
pouring-rights contracts.108 Therefore, states and localities as a whole
have not filled the regulatory void left by federal inaction; rather,
they have been unable to stop the proliferation of pouring-rights
contracts.
D. Judicial Attempts to Restrict the Sale of Soft Drinks
No court has specifically addressed pouring-rights contracts in
schools. However, a number of decisions display the courts’
willingness to permit the sale of soft drinks in public schools and their
unwillingness to prohibit commercial activities in public schools.
In National Soft Drink Ass’n v. Block,109 the D.C. Circuit
prevented the USDA from prohibiting the sale of soft drinks in public
schools. The Secretary of the USDA issued rules in 1980 that
restricted the sale of soft drinks and other competitive, unapproved
foods until “after the last lunch period.”110 Organizations representing
producers and sellers of soft drinks challenged the rules as exceeding
the Secretary’s statutory jurisdiction.111 The trial court held that the
Secretary was duly authorized to issue these rules.112 It reasoned that
“[t]he clear purpose of the [federal meals program] would be
frustrated if foods identified as non-nutritious could be sold fifteen
minutes before lunch or in vending machines located down a corridor
from the cafeteria.”113
The court of appeals reversed, holding that “the Secretary
exceeded his rule making authority when he promulgated the time
106. Press Release, The Coca-Cola Company, Coca-Cola Announces New Education
Advisory Council; Major Changes in Its Public/Private Education Partnerships with the Nation’s
Schools, at http://www2.coca-
cola.com/presscenter/pc_include/nr_03142001_education_advisory_council_ include.html (Mar.
14, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“Working with schools to comply with all
federal, state, and local guidelines, the Coca-Cola bottlers will unconditionally honor the wishes
of all schools that seek to limit the sale of beverages at certain points of the school day, or at
certain locations on school campuses.”).
107. McKay, supra note 27, at B1.
108. Id.
109. 721 F.2d 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
110. 7 C.F.R. § 210.15(b) (1981).
111. Block, 721 F.2d at 1351.
112. Id. at 1351.
113. Id. (quoting district court opinion).
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and place regulations barring the sale of competitive foods
throughout the school and until after the end of the last service of the
day.”114 In so holding, the court relied on the section of the statute
that limited the authority of the Secretary “to the sale of competitive
foods in ‘food service facilities or areas during the service of food’
under the school nutritional program.”115 As a result of Block, and
unless Congress removes this limitation, the Secretary can prevent
only the sale of soft drinks in the cafeteria during the lunch periods of
schools that participate in federal meal programs.
State v. Whittle Communications116 and Dawson v. East Side
Union High School District117 are two principal cases that address the
legality of commercial activities in public schools. While these
decisions do not address soft-drink sales or pouring-rights contracts,
they show the hesitance of the judiciary to curb commercial activities
in schools. In Whittle, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered
whether the North Carolina State Board of Education had the
authority to prohibit schools from contracting for Channel One
television services.118 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
forcing students to watch commercial television was against public
policy and therefore void under the North Carolina Constitution.119
Instead, in the words of one commentator, the court “relied on the
fact that the program was not mandatory.”120 The court stressed that it
should defer to the legislature.121 Thus, Whittle “represents a triumph
for local autonomy in public education” by rejecting the argument
114. Id. at 1353. Judge Wilkey dissented and wrote that he would “leave it to the legislature
to decide whether it prefers the position of this court or that of the Secretary and the District
Court.” Id. at 1355.
115. Id. at 1352–53 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1779).
116. 402 S.E.2d 556 (N.C. 1991).
117. 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
118. Whittle, 402 S.E.2d at 559 (examining “whether the trial court erred in determining . . .
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint [and] whether the trial court erred
in failing to find that Whittle’s contract is contrary to public policy and the North Carolina
Constitution and therefore void”). This Note will not discuss the court’s principal ruling, which
was “that the State Board of Education did not have the authority to enact the temporary rule
concerning the Whittle contracts because these contracts involve the selection and procurement
of supplementary materials, an area which the General Assembly has specifically placed under
the . . . supervision of the local school boards.” Id. at 557.
119. Id. at 564–65 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Article IX, section 2(1) of the
North Carolina Constitution and its requirement for a “general and uniform system of free
public schools” makes commercial advertising void as against public policy).
120. Dasinger, supra note 14, at 200–01.
121. Whittle, 402 S.E.2d at 564.
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that commercial activity in public schools is void as against
public policy.122
A California court of appeals in Dawson also held that
commercial activities “are not illegal as a matter of law.”123 In that
case, California’s Superintendent of Public Instruction resisted a
contract with Channel One, considering “‘the crux of the issue [to be]
the illegal and unethical use of schools’ unique access to an extremely
valuable commercial audience which [Channel One] wants to
monopolize.’”124 Nevertheless, the Board of Trustees approved the
contract, prompting a suit by the Superintendent.125 Upholding the
contract, the court reasoned that the legislature must set educational
policy because the “assessment of ‘core [educational] values’ is
beyond the scope of our judicial function.”126
Although no court has had the opportunity to review pouring-
rights contracts, some opponents of those contracts have recently
indicated their intent to sue. For example, one group has threatened
that Seattle School Board “members could be held individually liable
for health problems suffered by students if the district violates its
‘fiduciary duty’ to protect students’ health.”127 This litigation
resembles the “new group of class action tort cases [that] allege that
children who are frequent patrons of . . . fast-food restaurants have
become obese and, as a result, have developed serious health
problems . . . .”128
Although it is too early to evaluate these new cases, established
case law suggests that any attempt to prohibit pouring-rights contracts
or the sale of soft drinks in public schools must pursue legislative
122. Michele L. Harrington, State v. Whittle Communications: Allowing Local Boards to
Turn on “Channel One”, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1929, 1945–46 (1992).
123. Dawson v. East Side Union High Sch. Dist., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 121 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994). However, the court limited its holding by cautioning that “a showing of more intrusive
commercial content, or of less effective editorial content, might warrant a conclusion that it
would be an abuse of discretion for a school district to enter into such a contract.” Id. at 120.
124. Id. at 113.
125. Id. at 113–14.
126. Id. at 128.
127. Keith Ervin, School Board Is Warned Against Coke Contract, SEATTLE TIMES, July 2,
2003, at B1; see also Neil Buckley, Obesity Campaign on Drinks in Schools, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 23, 2003, at 10 (“School authorities that sign exclusive contracts to sell soft
drinks such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi in vending machines could become the next big target of the
growing legal movement against the US obesity epidemic.”).
128. John Alan Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims Against Fast-Food
Companies, 12 WIDENER L.J. 103, 110 (2003).
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solutions. Specifically, Block, Whittle, and Dawson stress that courts
should not usurp the educational policy of the legislature.129 The
Whittle court stated that “[w]hether the public policy established by
[education statutes] is wise or unwise is for determination by the
General Assembly.”130 Commentators echo this judicial discretion.
For example, after addressing Channel One litigation in New York,
one commentator stated that the “proper forum for the Channel One
debate is not in courtrooms, but at local school board meetings and
elections.”131 In sum, as of now, the proper means for solving the
problems of pouring-rights contracts is not litigation, but legislation.
III.  SOLUTION
This Part advances a solution to the problems of pouring-rights
contracts, beginning with a survey of other proposals. Based on these
proposals and on the previous two Parts, this Part outlines the
elements that any solution to pouring-rights contracts must contain.
This Part concludes by using these elements to propose new
legislation.
A. Myriad Proposals
Commentators respond to criticisms levied against pouring-rights
contracts with myriad proposals. The first and simplest proposal is to
do nothing.132 Indeed, this Note’s thesis that pouring-rights contracts
are harmful to students and to education is controversial, especially to
local school boards and soft-drink companies. School boards, and
many taxpayers,133 could argue that these contracts provide a vital
129. See also Richmond Welfare Rights Org. v. Snodgrass, 525 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1975)
(“The individual defendants herein, not the courts, were elected and empowered to make
precisely such decisions. If defendants ultimately and lawfully adopt what may be perceived as
an inhumanly callous position, the matter is one for correction by the voters of the district, not
for us.”).
130. State v. Whittle Communications, 402 S.E.2d 556, 564 (N.C. 1991) (citing Martin v.
Hous. Auth., 175 S.E.2d 665, 672 (N.C. 1970)).
131. Spenny, supra note 65, at 367.
132. See, e.g., Nestle, supra note 38, at 312 (illustrating how soft-drink companies and school
officials justify the contracts as “breaking no new ground and argue that soft drink vending
machines already exist in schools, soft drinks already pervade American culture, children are
not forced to drink them, and contracts can be written with safeguards that protect students’
rights to drink other kinds of soda”).
133. See A Lucrative Soda Contract, GREENVILLE NEWS, Aug. 3, 2002, at 14A (“Some may
question the educational and nutritional value of promoting soft drinks at schools, but most
taxpayers likely will welcome a funding stream that may offset some tax revenues.”).
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source of funding.134 Soft-drink companies also argue that “publicly
supported schools should not dictate what students eat when parents
and children want something else.”135 A similar proposal is to let
states and localities decide for themselves what to do.136 This proposal
of federal abstention and state experimentation is the current course
of action.137 And as noted in Part II.C, this course has permitted the
growth of pouring-rights contracts.
A slightly more proactive proposal is to keep pouring-rights
contracts, but to provide students with healthy alternatives to soft
drinks.138 For example, the National Institutes of Health proposes that
schools should give students “food options that are low in fat,
calories, and added sugars, such as fruits, vegetables, whole grains,
and low-fat or nonfat dairy foods.”139 This proposal often includes
nutrition education as a way to encourage students to choose these
healthier alternatives.140
A proposal that focuses on cost as a disincentive to buying soft
drinks is to keep pouring-rights contracts, but to tax the sale of soft
drinks.141 Some commentators analogize a tax on soft drinks to a tax
134. See Nakamura, supra note 56 (“The students may be junk food junkies, but the schools
are hooked, too, increasingly dependent on the revenue that soda and candy machines bring in
each year.”); Susan Lynn Roberts, Note, School Food: Does the Future Call for New Food
Policy or Can the Old Still Hold True?, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 587, 608 (2002) (“Given the
dollars to be made . . . it can be understood why many school administrators find it convenient
to avoid the health and ethical implications of ‘pouring rights’ contracts.”).
135. Nestle, supra note 38, at 309.
136. See supra notes 98–108 and accompanying text (noting that states and localities have
taken considerably different approaches regarding the regulation of soft drinks in public
schools).
137. See supra notes 84–108 and accompanying text.
138. See Carole Sugarman, Stock School Vending Machines with Cereal Bars, No Soda, Say
Dietitians, FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Sep. 16, 2002, at 29 (suggesting that “[c]arrying healthier
items in vending machines and making them less expensive than their sugary, higher-fat, higher-
calorie counterparts are just a few options. . . .”).
139. Office of the Surgeon General, Overweight and Obesity: A Vision for the Future, at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/fact_vision.htm (last modified Nov.
20, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
140. See id. (advising schools to help “students develop the knowledge, attitudes, skills, and
behaviors to adopt, maintain, and enjoy healthy eating habits and a physically active lifestyle”);
see also Kramer-Atwood et al., supra note 55, at 1233 (“Local school policies should respond to
community needs and priorities and integrate the school nutrition programs with education.”).
141. See Jim Ritter, Teens Take off the Fat Bite by Bite, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 23, 2002, at
14 (“Obesity in children has become so serious that some health advocates suggest that federal
and local governments start taxing sugar-rich soft drinks and restricting snack foods in
schools . . . .”); see also Consumers Union, Captive Kids: A Report on Commercial Pressures on
Kids at Schools, at http://www.consumersunion.org/other/captivekids/recommendations.htm
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on cigarettes,142 arguing that the revenue from these taxes should be
reinvested into obesity-prevention programs.143
Another proposal calls for Congress to reinstate the authority
that the Secretary of the USDA had in 1980 to restrict the sale of soft
drinks. The American Federation of Teachers, for example, “supports
federal efforts to re-establish the authority of the Secretary of
Agriculture to regulate the sale of all foods throughout the entire
school until the end of the school day.”144 Another commentator
argues that “Congress should create a single food safety agency that
has sufficient authority to protect public health.”145
The most comprehensive proposal is to prohibit pouring-rights
contracts by changing the federal laws that permit them.146 The
USDA, for example, wants to “[s]trengthen the statutory language to
ensure that all foods sold or served anywhere in the school during the
school day meet nutrition standards.”147 The Surgeon General is one
of many who propose that schools should “[a]dopt policies ensuring
that all foods and beverages available on school campuses and at
school events contribute toward eating patterns that are consistent
with the Dietary Guidelines for Americans.”148
(last visited Dec. 30, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (stating that Congress should
“[e]liminate tax benefits for corporate contributions to schools that carry a commercial
message”).
142. See, e.g., Ritter, supra note 141.
143. See Lori Lohmeyer, Los Angeles School District Votes to Ban Soda Sales on 677
Campuses, NATION’S RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 9, 2002, at 16 (“The controversial bill, written
by Sen. Deborah Ortiz, D-Sacramento, initially sought to raise as much as $300 million a year in
taxes on all soda sales in the state to combat childhood obesity and fund incentives for schools
to halt soft-drink sales.”).
144. American Federation of Teachers, Resolution on Regulating the Sale of Competitive
Foods in Schools, at http://www.aft.org/about/resolutions/2000/compfoods.html (July 2000) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal); see also NESTLE, supra note 2, at 368 (suggesting that Congress
reconsider legislation to improve the “agency’s ability to regulate food and supplement
supply”).
145. ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN
MEAL 264 (2001).
146. See American Dietetic Association, Position of the American Dietetic Association:
Competitive Foods in Schools, 91 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 1123, 1124 (1991) (advocating for the
complete prohibition of soft drinks and other competitive foods of minimal nutritional value).
147. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 34.
148. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 41, at 20.
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B. Necessary Elements to Any Solution
Considering the proposals outlined above and the failure of
current legal authority outlined in Part II, there are at least three
necessary elements to any solution to the problems caused by
pouring-rights contracts.
First, any solution must come from the federal level. Local
control does not adequately address the proliferation of these
contracts and their associated problems. After Block, states could
have adopted new laws to regulate soft drinks, yet no state prohibits
the sale of soft drinks. While some cities and communities have taken
action against pouring-rights contracts, most schools and local boards
rarely have the resources to resist these lucrative contracts. Indeed,
schools are often “the staunchest opponents” to restricting these
contracts because limiting the sale of soft drinks removes a source of
school funding.149 Moreover, the specifics of each pouring-rights
contract may prevent local action because “the agreements between
schools and soda companies sometimes deter principals from
following state policy, especially since how much schools make is
often tied to how much they sell.”150 Local control also fails because it
creates a patchwork in which wealthy school districts can afford to
resist these contracts, while poorer districts cannot.151
Second, any solution must move beyond the current federal law.
Current federal regulations fail because they address only the sale of
soft drinks in the cafeteria during the lunch period. Moreover, soft
drinks compete with healthier beverages, such as juice or milk.152
Thus, keeping current rules that merely restrict the time or place of
soft-drink sales ignores the underlying problem that the frequent
149. Greg Winter, States Try to Limit Sales of Junk Food in School Buildings, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 2001, at A1; see also Salit & Tarricone, supra note 35 (noting one principal’s suggestion
that because soft-drink companies already do business in schools, the schools should be able to
receive something in return).
150. Winter, supra note 149.
151. See supra note 36–37 and accompanying text; see also Newsome, supra note 31, at 313
(“[E]conomic disparity does not justify differential treatment of student privacy interests.”).
The Supreme Court rejected this argument when it held that classifications based on wealth are
an “inappropriate case in which to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny.” San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1972). However, the Court’s rationale does not
mitigate the policy and pragmatic force of my argument because the Court limited its discussion
to whether wealth classifications fit within its strict scrutiny jurisprudence, see id. at 38–39, not
whether these classifications were harmful as a policy matter.
152. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
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consumption of soft drinks is unhealthy.153 Similarly, current
regulations deter litigation against school districts that approve
pouring-rights contracts.154
Third, any solution must address squarely the sale of soft drinks
rather than pursuing merely a piecemeal approach. Piecemeal
solutions—such as healthier alternatives in vending machines or taxes
on the sale of soft drinks—fail because they permit students to
continue to buy soft drinks and because they do not address the
problems caused by pouring-rights contracts.155 Taxes fail specifically
because they do not remove a school’s incentive to encourage the sale
of soft drinks and thus increase the revenue that it receives from soft-
drink companies.
In sum, any solution to the problems of pouring-rights contracts
must include the following elements: (1) federal action to remove the
local incentive to sign pouring-rights contracts and to establish
uniform standards for poor and wealthy districts; (2) fundamental
changes in the current laws to restrict the sale of soft drinks beyond
merely during lunch in the cafeteria; and (3) comprehensive action to
address the underlying problems of the sale of soft drinks and the
proliferation of pouring-rights contracts.
C. Proposed Legislation
Applying the three elements from the previous Section, this Note
proposes federal legislation that eliminates current regulations that
permit the sale of soft drinks in public schools. In place of these
regulations, the legislation would ban pouring-rights contracts and the
sale of soft drinks in public schools.156 This legislation would ban the
153. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 127–131 and accompanying text.
155. See Nakamura, supra note 56 (“[The principal of one high school] says that years ago
he tried an experiment. He filled one machine with more healthy drinks, such as V-8 juice.
Virtually no one bought the product, he said.”).
156. This Note does not address questions of federalism nor the specifics of federal action
because the purpose of this Note is to justify action against pouring-rights contracts and to
outline a solution, not to delve into the specifics of implementation. However, federalism is
unlikely to be a problem because the USDA already has the authority to regulate the sale of
soft drinks under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751–1765 (2000); merely enhancing this power to ban rather
than to regulate does not materially change the nature of federal action. Similarly, this Note
does not address the specifics of how to finance my solution. However, financing is unlikely to
be a problem because current estimates only place the value of vending machine sales, of which
the sale of soft drinks are only a part, at $750 million, Severson, supra note 100. Moreover, one
commentator argued that because soft drinks increase obesity, “students become heavier[,] . . .
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sale of soft drinks because of the health problems of soft-drink
consumption. Moreover, by banning the sale of soft drinks, this
legislation would also prohibit pouring-rights contracts because of
their unique educational problems and because they contribute to the
health problems associated with soft-drink consumption.
To adopt this proposal, Congress should enact legislation that
expressly requires the USDA to ban the sale of soft drinks in public
schools. The USDA should implement this law because it is
responsible for nutrition control and because it supports it.157 The
legislation and accompanying regulations that ban the sale of soft
drinks should be drafted scrupulously because soft-drink companies
have a history of trying to evade the law by “donating sodas to
schools for free distribution during school meal periods,”158 and by
developing sweetened fruit drinks that “contain just enough juice
(5%) to circumvent definition as a food of minimal nutritional
value.”159
Such legislation would have several limitations, such as
addressing only one cause of obesity and addressing only the sale of
soft drinks and not the other “junk foods” sold through school
vending machines. Yet, these limitations do not mitigate the need for
a solution. While frequent soft-drink consumption in schools has
always been unhealthy, the problem is becoming worse with the
proliferation of pouring-rights contracts. The current trend portends
more sales and larger bottles; this trend is worsened by pouring-rights
contracts.160 Moreover, the longer that schools sell soft drinks, the
more dependent schools will become on money that pouring-rights
contracts provide. That is, as governments see that schools are
adequately funded by corporations, they will perceive less of a need
for government funding of education.161 Thus, although this solution is
limited, it specifically addresses a serious and immediate problem.162
their health deteriorates, [and] more serious ailments like diabetes can arise, leading to higher
health care costs over time.” Winter, supra note 149.
157. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
158. Nestle, supra note 38, at 315.
159. Id. One possible way in which the USDA could implement this rule is to ban the sale of
both soft drinks and beverages that are nutritionally similar to soft drinks or fail to meet higher
nutritional standards.
160. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
161. See J. Sheehan, Why I Said No to Coca-Cola, AM. SCH. BOARD J., Oct. 1999, at
http://www.asbj.com/199910/1099coverstory.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(reporting that a principal of a high school stated that he rejected a pouring-rights contract
because “[i]t sends the message to our voters and legislators that we can let them off the hook—
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CONCLUSION
The Surgeon General recently issued a “Call to Action” to
address the “epidemic proportions” of obesity.163 Against this
backdrop, pouring-rights contracts—and the problems associated
with these contracts—are proliferating. These contracts now control
the sale of soft drinks in nearly one of every three school districts.164
Unfortunately, the federal government’s current regulations only
permit it to restrict the sale of soft drinks in a school cafeteria during
the lunch period. Local school boards and state legislatures have
attempted to fill the void created by federal inaction with a
patchwork of proposals. This patchwork leaves many students
unprotected from the problems caused by pouring-rights contracts
and soft-drink consumption. To address this problem, the federal
government should mend the tattered patchwork by enacting
legislation to ban pouring-rights contracts and the sale of soft drinks
in public schools.
that advertising and sales of consumer products can fill the gap when it comes to supporting
education”).
162. Although beyond the scope of this Note, nothing that this Note proposes eschews
future legislation to remove candy, chips, or other “junk foods” from public schools. Indeed,
many of the arguments that this Note makes against soft drinks can be made against other “junk
foods” that are sold in public schools.
163. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 41, at xiii.
164. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
